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and with the perfect ability to comprehend and be shocked by the
enormity of the act, must necessarily reveal itself in the organization by symptoms that are unmistakeable in their character. If the
jury are required to find the sufficiency of these, and -also the irresistibility of the impulse under which the act is done, it will rarely
occur that crime will go unpunished, or the community be rendered
unsafe.
A. D.
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JULIA A. FOSTER VS. RUFUS DWINEL.

1. A tenant in an action of dower is not estopped from showing that the seisin of
the husband was not such as to give his wife a right of dower, where he or his
grantor has accepted a deed of the premises from the husband and claims under
it, although he may be estopped from denying the right of the husband to give
the deed.
2. Estoppels are mutual. The wife is not estopped if the husband, in a deed, misstates his title-as one not giving dower.
3. Dower is no part of the estate of the husband, but an independent and inchoitto
right, which may become an interest in the estate after his death, if his seisili
was such as to give it. But the law will not create this estate by the operation
of an estoppel where it otherwise would not exist, where the tenant has simply
accepted a deed from the husband, which does not allude to the matter of dower,
or to the existence of the wife.
4. Where it appears in the deed from the husband, that his title is only that of
mortgagee before foreclosure, no estoppel can arise.
5. The wife of a mortgagee cannot claim dower in an estate until-the same is f6re,
closed by the husband.

Action for dower. Marriage. Death of the husband -nu
demand admitted. The seisin of the husband in such a manner
as to entitle his wife to dower denied. It was agreed that" thb
husband, with two others, during the coverture, received a deed bf
mortgage of the premises, and entered to! foreclose; but before
the expiration of the three years allowed for redemption, conveyed
the land, by deed of release and quitf 'aim, to Benjamin Lincoln-v
under whom the tenant, through suiidry'mesne coiveyances, h6ldi.
and claims the same...
..
,VII."
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Joseph Granger, for defendant.
John A. Peters, for tenant.
KENT, J.-The issue joined in tnis case is upu±I the seisin of
the husband during coverture. The defendant denies that the
husband was so s eised of a dowable estate.
Two questions arise:1st. Is the defendant estopped from denying such seisin, and
from establishing by proof that the husband's seisin was such that
no right of dower ever existed?
2d. If not, was the seisin of the husband, on the facts agreed,
such as to give a right to dower in the premises?
In relation to the first point, we find that the tenant has derived
his title from the husband through mesne conveyances: the deed
from the husband and two others having been given to Benjamin
Lincoln, from whom the title was passed to defendant.
It is insisted, in the first place, that the tenant is estopped to
deny that the wife is entitled to dower, because the tenant has
and claims title derived from the husband; and this without reference to the nature of the conveyance from the husband, whether
by deed of warranty, or a mere release or quit claim. It is contended that when the tenant holds under a conveyance from the
husband, whatever its form, he is estopped from controverting the
seisin of the husband, and from showing that it was not such as to
entitle his wife to dower. The doctrine asserted goes beyond the
rule that the production of a deed of conveyance from the husband
and evidence that the tenant claims and holds under that deed is
primdfacie sufficient to establish the claim of the widow to dower,
if uncontrolled ; but it claims that it is not to be controlled by any
evidence, and that the doctrine of estoppel comes in and excludes
absolutely every other fact.
It is, undoubtedly true that this principle is to be found, more
or less directly asserted, in many cases in this state, and in New
York and other states. Kimball vs. Kimball, 2 Green 226; Navqn vs. Allen, 6 Green 243; Smith vs. Ingalls, 13 Me. 284;
Haines vs. Gardner,10 Me. 383, and other cases; Bancroft vs.
White, 1 Caines 185; Hitchcockc vs. .Harrington, 6 John. 290;
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Brown vs. Potter, 17 Wend. 164, and several other cases in New
York.
It is equally true that in New York this doctrine, which had
been deemed settled there for forty years, has been oyerruled, and
the contrary doctrine fully established. Sparrow vs. fingman, 1
Comstock 242; Finn vs. Sleight, 8 Barbour 401.
In our own state, in the case of Gammon vs. Freeman, 31 Me.
248, the point was made, and thus disposed of by SHIPLEY, -C. J.:
It is insisted that the tenant is estopped to deny the seisin of
the husband, as he holds the estate by a title derived from him;
while he may not be permitted to deny that the husband was seised,
he may be permitted to show the character of 'that seisin, and that
it was not such that his widow would be entitled to dower." .This
principle is indicated in Campbell vs. Knight8, 241Me. 232. Tabe
same doctrine is found in Moore vs. Bsty, 5 N. H. 479.
In the last edition of Kent's Commentaries (vol. iv. p. 38, not6)
it is stated that the law in New York is now established-as declarod
in the recent cases.
In the able and instructive work by Prof. Washburn, on Real
Property, the author evidently doubts the soundness of the early
decisions, and inclines to consider the recent cases to be in accordance with the doctrines of the common law and the principles on
which they are based. See also Gardner vs. Greene, 5 R. -I. 104,
(hereafter more fully stated.)
In this state of the.authorities, we may be at liberty to consider
the questions raised in this case as in doubt, and the former decisions as shaken, if not overruled.
We may the more properly do so, when we find that such -able
jurists as Judge Cowms and Judge BRONSON of New-York, whilst
yielding to the apparent force of the earlier authorities, both admit
that the doctrine of estoppel, in their judgment, was improperly
applied to cases of dower, and cannot be sustained upon principle.
2 Hill 308; 1 Comstock 242.
If the tenant is estopped it must be because his grantors accepted
a deed from plaintiff's husband. Why should that fact estop the
defendant from showing that the husband was not seised in such a
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manner as to give a right of dower? It is unnecessary to go over
all the learning and all the nice distinctions to be found in the
books and in adjudged cases. The definition given by Lord Coke
of an estoppel is not calculated to recommend it to one in search
of truth and the right of the case:-" An estoppel is where a man
is concluded by his own act or acceptance to say the truth.". It
is, nevertheless, a doctrine, when strictly guarded and applied, of
essential importance and perfectly just and reasonable. It is
based on the great principle of right, that a man shall not be permitted to contradict what he has solemnly affirmed under his hand
and seal; nor shall he deny any act done or statement made, when
he cannot do so without a fraud on his part and injury to others.
When a person gives a deed he is not allowed to deny or contradict anything distinctly stated as a fact. There must be certainty
of allegation, and a particular and not a general recital. Roll. Ab.
Estoppel, pl. 1-7; 1 Show. 59; Doe vs. Buckenell, 2 Barn. & Ad.
278.
But this is a case of accepting, not giving, a deed. There has
been some obscurity introduced into the cases, by not distinguishing between a deed indented and a deed poll. An indented deed
is considered as the deed of both and -ofeach party, and the statements and recitations therein, the words of each, and therefore
both are bound and estopped thereby. 1 Shep. Touch. 53. But a
deed poll is of one part, and is the deed and language of the
grantoronly. Co. Litt. 47 6, 368 5. But there may be an estoppel in pais "by acceptance of an estate." Co. Litt. §§ 666-7.
This rule applies to cases where, by denying the title, the rights
of the landlord or some party would be injuriously affected thereby.
As when a deed accepted creates the relation which imposes on
the grantee a duty or obligation, express or implied, at some time,
or in some manner, to surrender the premises to the grantor or
his heirs or assigns, as landlord and tenant, trustee, mortgagor
and mortgagee. There must be remaining some right in grantor
and some duty towards him in grantee in relation to the surrender
of the estate. Williston vs. Watson. 3 Pet. 47 ; Watkins vs. fol-
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in fee is under no such obligation. Small vs. Proctor, 15 Mass.
499; Fox vs. Widgey, 4 Green. 218; 8,varrow vs. Eingman, 1
Comst. 248.
A man who takes a warranty deed in fee, is not estopped from
denying the seisin of his grantor, or from alleging his want of
title, or the existence of encumbrances. If he were, no action
could be maintained on the covenant of seisin, or on .any covenant
in the deed. Small vs. Proctor, above.
'.
It is now settled in this state (overruling the case of' airbanks
vs. Williamson, 7 Green.) that where a' party has given a quit
claim deed, he is not estopped from setting up 'his title, subsequently acquired, unless by so doing he is obliged to deny or cotradict some fact alleged in his former conveyance. Pike -v.
Galvin, 29 Me. 185. It follows, a fortiori, that a grantee, 'who
merely takes a deed, cannot be estopped to deny the title, orlo
acquire a new and independent, one, unless 'by so' doing his' -acts
work a fraud or injury upon the legal rights of some other persoi.
Right vs. Bukenell, 2 Barn. & Ad. -278.
It is a well settled rule that estoppels must be mutual, i. e. both
parties must be bound. In the' case' of Grant'vs. Wainmaw, '8
Bingham's N. Cases 69, it appeared that the tenant took land from
the assignees of demandant's husband by a 'deed which described
them as freehold; and it was held that he was not estopped by
taking that deed, as against the deniandant in 'dower, from proving
that the estate was in fact leasehold, in which the widow was not
entitled to dower. The reason given is, that every'estoppel must
be reciprocal-that is, must bind both parties (Oo., Litt. 352 'a);
that, in this case, if the defendants had taken a deed of premises
as leasehold only, when in fact they were freehold, the widow would
not be estopped from proving the fact, 'notithstAnding the recital
in the deed. The ground of this decision seeins to be,"that the
wife or widow is not a party or privy'to the conveyance. Her
claim is 'by a title paramount and distintt, -audj.theieforei she
is' not estopped; and, on the doctrine of 4iittuality, the tenant
cannot be estopped. If the husband, in ourmode of'conveyance
by deed, should, in his deed, describe his estate as one for life or
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a term of years, when in fact he had a fee, his widow might claim
dower, and sustain her claim by proof of the facts. Campbell vs.
Knights, 24 Me., before referred to.
In this last case it appeared that the demandants were mortgagees, and the husband only mortgagor ; that, after the death of
the husband, his administrator sold his right in equity under
license; that, prior to such sale, the widow's dower in these premises had been set out to her. The mortgagees purchased the
equity at the sale by administrator, and took 4 deed from him, in
which were these words: "reserving from this conveyance the
widow's dower, which has been assigned and set out heretofore."
It was contended that the demandants, by accepting a deed with
this reservation, were estopped to deny that the dower had been
properly assigned, and that-the widow was entitled to dower as
against them. The court held that the admission could not be
extended beyond its exact terms; that estoppels are mutual;
that, in this case, the clause did not admit, as respected themselves as mortgagees, that her husband died seised, or that she
was entitled to dower in the premises, and that.they were not precluded from establishing a title which may be good and not inconsistent with their admissions; that, if their title under the mortgage was still outstanding, they would be entitled to recover, even
as to the parts set off as dower, and the widow must redeem to be
entitled to dower. The case of Gardner vs. Greene, 5 R. I. 104,
is directly in point. It is there held that -the acceptance of a
deed poll, conveying with covenants of warrantee lands purchased,
and taking and holding possession under it, do .not estop the
grantee ,from disputing the grantor's title to such lands, prior to
and at the time of the conveyance, upon a subsequent claim of
dower in the lands by the widow of the grantor.
'The reasoning of the court in this case fully sustains the ground
taken by.the tenant in the case before us. If we depart from
technical iules, and inquire what there is in the nature of an
estate indower that should give it this right of creation out of the
mere fact that the tenant, or those undei whom he holds, took a
VOL. 10.-39
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title from the husband, we may be at a loss to discover any substantial reason.
We have seen that a widow cannot be, defeated of her dower by
any declarations or recitals of her husband. Why should she be
allowed, as against the truth, to create this right, when it neverexisted, by the mere fact that a title, of some kind has been taken
from the husband? If it were true that every seisin of the husband, which gave him a right to convey an estate or interest in iti
was necessarily a dowable seisin, there would be more force in the
argument. But this is not true. A man may have only the estate
and right of a mortgagee, which will not give dower, and yet he
may properly give a deed of the premises. Hutohins vs, Carlton,
19 N. H. 487; 15 N. H. 55.
There are many other cases where 'the title in the.husband may
give him a seisin and a right to convey his interest, and yet not
in law give the wife a right of dower. The right of dower is an
inchoate right. It lies dormant during the life of the husband. It
may never become operative. It is not, properly speaking, any
part of the husband's estate during his life. It is an independent
inchoate right in his estate, if his seisin is such as to give the right
of dower after his death. Barbour vs. Barbour, 46 Me. 1. It
would seem to be a great stretch of the doctrine of'estoppel to say
that by accepting a deed from the husband, which in no way alludes
to the matter of dower, or to the existence of a wife of grantor, the
tenant is not only estopped from denying an actual seisin in the
husband, sufficient to enable him to give the deed, but is also
estopped from denying that the seisin was such as to give a third
person an independent right in the estate, although, in truth, no
such seisin ever existed, thus creating an estate by a rule of law
where none ever before existed.
But, looking at the case before us on the ground that the
defendant is estopped from denying anything expressly and particularly set forth as statement in the deed which he received, the
question arises, What is thus stated in the deed from the husband?
Is there any admission of a seisin in the husband which will give
the wife dower? No man is estopped where the truth appears in
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the same deed. Co. Litt. 352-6; Com. Dig. Estoppel, B. 2. The
language of the deed is this: "meaning hereby to convey the same
premises which was conveyed to us by Ransom Clark, by his mortgage deed, dated July 11th, 1835, and recorded in Penobscot's
Registry, vol. 71, p. 142."
If the tenant is estopped by the recital, what is that recital? Is
it anything more than that the title of the husband was that of
mortgagee? There is no averment that the mortgage had been
foreclosed; and the admission cannot be carried beyond what is
affirmed "with certainty and particularity." The title and seisin
named in the deed is not such as gives a right of dower, being only
the title of a mortgagee. The tenant's grantor accepted only such
an estate as is described in terms in the deed, and in any event an
estoppel cannot arise by the assumption of the existence of any
fact not clearly and distinctly stated in the deed. On the deed
itself, therefore, no estoppel arises in this case.
'If the tenant may be allowed to prove the nature and extent of
the seisin of the husband, and to show that it was not a dowable
seisin (as we think he may), the facts'agreed upon show that the
husband never had any other title or interest in the premises than
that of a mortgagee, who had entered for foreclosure, but had not
perfected it. The deed from the husband was delivered before the
expiration of the three years after entry to foreclose. This deed,
upon inspection, appears to be a quit claim, and not a warrantee
deed, as stated in the report of the case. It is well established
law that the wife of a mortgagee cannpt claim dower in an estate,
until the same is foreclosed by the husband. 4 Kent's Com. 43;
4 Dane Abr. 671; Washburn on R. Actions, ch. 7, § 15.
The husband in this case was never so seised as to give his wife
a right to dower in the.premises.
Plaintiff, nonsuit.

[Same Term.]
JULIA A. FOSTER vs. SYLVESTER GORDON.

This case, in most of its facts, resembled the foregoing case, vs.
Dwinel. The only seisin and right that the husband had was
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derived from a levy of an execution in his favor on. his debtors'
property. The husband gave a deed, of quit claim, under which
tenant claims, before the expiration of the year allowed for redemption to the debtors. It was decided that the husband had no
seisin that gave his wife a right of dower in the land levied on.
Granger, for plaintiff.
Briggs, for defendant.
We are indebted to the courtesy of
Mr. Justice KENT for the foregoing very
able and satisfactory exposition of the
law of estoppels by deed, as applicable
to the subject of dower, and how far the
rights of the grantee of the husband are
liable to be affected by tl~e acceptance
of the deed of the husband.
1. There is no rule of law better established than that estoppels, to be binding, must be mutually so upon both
parties. 3 Thomas Coke 842; Co. Litt.
352, b. "Every estoppel ought to be reciprocal, that is, to bind both parties."
This extends to privies in blood, and in
estate. Under the latter, is here enumerated "tenant by dower."
But in
Gaunt vs. Wainman, 3 Bing. N. C. 69,
which was a writ of dower, where the
tenant pleaded that the husband of demandant had no endowable estate in the
premises, it was objected that he was
estopped to set up that fact, by having
accepted a deed from the husband's
assignees, wherein the premises were
described as freehold. But the court, on
argument, TnDAL, Ch. J., held that the
estoppel, not binding the wife, could not
bind the grantee of the husband's estate.
The learned judge quoted the above text
from Co. Litt., and further, "And this
is the reason that regularly a stranger
shall neither take advantage nor be
bound by the estoppel," and adds, "It
would be hard if it were otherwise."

The point seems to be here assumed, on
all hands, that the deed of the husband
is no estoppel upon the wife, even as to
the husband's title.
2: This last case seems to us a full
authority for the decision in the principal case. And the fact that the New
York courts have adopted the same view,
after enforcing the estoppel upon the
grantee of the husband for many years,
would seem to justify the expectation
that this rule would ultimately prevail.
The doctrine of estoppels is based
upon the policy of holding the party,
to a deed, or judgment, bound by the
admissions and implications growing out
of the instrument, or act, and it is part
of the policy of the law, not to carry the
estoppel beyond the clear and natural
import of the words; and it is never
extended beyond the parties, and privies,
in blood, and in estate. As the estate
of dower is one derived from the hugband, by a quasi inheritance, although
the wife may be said to hold, as purchaser, and in her own right, yet her
estate being dependent, not only upon
that of the husband, but also upon the
contingency of her surviving him, it
seems to us there is more plausibility in
holding the wife, as privy in estate with
the husband, and so entitled to claim
the benefit of, and bound to submit to,
all estoppels binding upon him in regard
to the estate that we have seen intimated
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in the case. And the earlier cases in
New York, referred to in the principal
case, and in some of the other states,
seem to have gone upon this ground,
without very clearly defining it. Wedge
vs. Moore, 6 Cush. R. 8; May vs. Tillman,
1 Mich. R. 262; Thompson vs. Egbert,
2 N. J. 459. But a different view was
taken in Crittenden vs. Woodruff, 6 Eng.
(Ark.) R. 82. See also Hugley vs. Gregg,
4 Dana 68. The more recent cases in
New York seem to admit of no question
in regard to the conclusive authority of
Sparrow vs. Kingman, 1 Comst. R. 242.
See to this effect, Finn vs. Sleight, 8 Barb.
R. 401. So that the estoppel seems there
to have been abandoned.
It seems therefore an unsettled question, to some extent, And while we
naturally feel, that the express decision
of the English courts, and that of three
of the American states, including New
York, must give an impetus in that
direction which it will be impossible to
resist, we nevertheless cannot comprehend how there is any injustice, or violation of principle, in enforcing the
estoppel, both against the wife, who succeeds to an estate in virtue of her husband's title, and which iq carved out of
that title, and also against the husband's
grantee. If the question depended solely
upon the application of fundamental
principles, we might incline in this direction. But the tide of authority certainly seems to be setting, very strongly,
in the opposite direction. And as no
injustice is done, by narrowing the application of such estoppels as exclude
the truth, the very class of which it has
been so often, and so justly, perhaps,
affirmed, that as they exclude the truth,
they should not be favored, we would
certainly not be understood, as having
fornxed any very clear opinion that the
estoppel'could be made to apply, both to
the wife and the grantee of the husband,

without too great refinement upon the
nature of an estate in dower. And
unless the estoppel can be made mutual
it surely cannot be held binding, without injustice, and an entire departure
from the fundamental quality of the
thing.
But it has seemed to us, upon a hasty
view of the subject, that the fallacy, if
any, consists, in admitting, that the
estoppel in regard to the husband's title,
does not bind the wife. The fact that
the husband conveys a leaseholdinterest
does not show that he does not claim to
own, and the grantee does not admit,
that he does, in fact, own, a freehold in
the premises at the same time. That is
often the case, no doubt, and may always
be supposed to be, in the case of a leasehold conveyance, without conflict either
with the deed, or its implications. It
may well be said the conveyance of the
lesser estate, unless there is some declaration to that effect, by no means implies
that the husband did not, at the date of
the deed, claim to have a larger estate.
And this is the only class of cases in
which it seems to have been admitted,
that no estoppel exists against the wife
showing that the husband had a larger
estate.
But suppose the husband conveys his
whole interest in the premises, and it
appears by the deeds, under which he
claims title, which thereby become part
of the estoppel by deed, that the husband
never pureiased, and never claimed any
larger estate, than a mere chattel interest, for a term of years, is not the wife
bound by this estoppel? If not, there
is certainly a very great uncertainty in
regard to the application of estoppels by
deed. Any purchaser under the husband
would be so estopped in regard to all
others, in the privity of blood or estate,
and we see no good reason why the wife
should not 1e, provided the bon& fide
character of the deed as to her is esta-
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blished. She is regarded as a purchaser
of the right of dower, because marriage
is a valuable consideration. She therefore derives her title under the same
title by which the husband holds, and
in regard to the incidents of estoppel,
we do not perceive that it would make
any difference if the husband, by deed,
should convey to any one, man or woman,
an estate in all lands In which he had
an inheritable interest, ofwhich he was
then seised, or might become thereafter
seised, during his life. In making this
supposition we lay out of the account
the effect of the registry and the rights
of creditors, and all questions of collusion between the husband andhis grantee
for the purpose of defeating such estate.
Supposing then the wife to have purchased, in form, as well'as in fact, the
contingent right of a life interest in all
the husband's estates of inheritance,
during his' life, to begin only at his
decease, and the husband to have conveyed an estate to some third party, as
aleasehold estate, and in regard to which
it appeared that he only purchased and
received a conveyance of a leasehold
interest, and claimed the same only under
such conveyance. It would certainly"
be unjust and unreasonable to allow the
wife to defeat the estate of the grantee
of the husband, during her own life, by
setting up a different estate in the husband from any ever purchased, or claimed
by him, and from that conveyed by him,
and bong fide purchased of him.
There is indeed one consideration in
regard to holding the wife bound by
estoppels, in the husband's deed, already
alluded to, which should not escape
notice; that is, where the husband conveys an estate of inieritance in fact,
describing it as a life estate, or for years,
for the mere purpose of defeating the
wife's right of dower. This would seem
a sufficient reason why estoppels created
by the husband should not operate against

the wife, unless it also appeared they
were bonDa fide, on his part. So that to
render the estoppel complete against the
wife, it seems requisite that the title
conveyed by the husband shduld correspond with that conveyed to him and
claimed by him during his tenure, or in
some other way that it was bon& fide.
We must conclude therefore that any
estoppels binding upon the husband, and
which existed at the date of the marriage,
or which were created subsequently, and
at the time of their creation were against
the interest of the husband- or in any
other way shown to be bond fide, do bind
the wife as a privy in estate, and to that
extent, the grantees of the husband are
estopped, in a suit for dower, to deny
any fact appearing in their deed from
the husband. At least such is our view
of the true application of the doctrine
of estoppel by deed to the subject in
question, if the subject were res integra.
It is probable that the fact of the
wife's estate dating from the marriage,
and the husband having an incidental
interest in defeating the contingent estate
of the wife, may be sufficient ground t6
reject, as to the wife, all estoppels created
by the husband, during the coverture,
and which operate in favor of the husband and against the interest of the
wife, if any such can be conceived, ivithout implying collusion and fraud, which
will defeat the deed itself, and, by consequence, any estoppel dependent upon it.
It will thus be perceived that the subject is one not free from embarrassment,
whether we attempt to determine it upon
the ground of principle or authority,
and therefore we are by no means sure,
the English case of Gaunt vs. Wainman,
supra, and thbse'which have followed in
its wake, in setting aside all estoppels
created through the intervention of the
husband, after the date of the marriage,
whether operating in his favor or against
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his interest, or that of the wife, may not
have pursued the wisest and fairest
course. The more we reflect upon the
subject, and the further we have examined and considered the rules of law,
and the decisions of the court, upon the
subject, the more fully we have become
reconciled to this view. We can there-

fore adopt the views of Mr. Justice KENT,
so satisfactorily presented, without any
misgivings, notwithstanding any impressiou we might have, that the courts might
in the first instance have adopted some
middle course, more consistent with principle and analogy, if not as simple and
easy of application.
I. F. R.

In the Supreme Court of Michigan.
JAMES A. RtICE VS. JOHN RUDDIMAN.
The rule of riparian proprietorship upon the river Detroit, as laid down in Lorman
vs. Benson, 8 Mich. 18, is applicable to Lake Muskegon; and the ownership
of land bordering upon the lake, carries with it the ownership of the land
under the water, so far out as it is susceptible of beneficial private use, but
subordinate to the paramount public right of navigation, and the other public
rights incident thereto.

Error to the Circuit Court for Muskegon County.
Walker & 1Bussell, for plaintiff in error.
Cr. i.

. Tothrop, for defendant in error.

CIMISTIAN cY, J.-The errors assigned, raise the question whe-

ther riparian ownership of lands along Muskegon Lake is to be
governed by the law applicable to tide-waters, or substantially by
the common law rule applicable to fresh-water streams above the
ebb and flow of the tide.
The plaintiff below appears to have been the owner of fractional section eighteen, town ten north, range sixteen west,
bounded according to the United States survey of the public
lands, by the water line of the lake. The section was made
fractional by the waters of the lake occupying a part of what
would otherwise have fallen within its lines. He had executed a
mortgage of this 'fractional section, which bad been foreclosed in
the United States Circuit Court for the district of Michigan.

RICE vs. RUDDIMAN.

Either about the time of the mortgage or afterwards, and before
the foreclosure, he had erected a saw-mill and other buildings in
the shallow waters of the lake,. about twenty-nine rods from the
margin or meandered line of the section, but within the area which
but for the water would have been within the lines of the section,
and at or a little beyond the point where a sand-bar extending
from the land sunk below the water; the depth of the water where
the mill was built being about two feet. This sand-bar at the time
the mill was built furnished the roadway to or very nearly to the
mill, but in subsequent higher stages of the water was covered
and a roadway was made of slabs to the land, and the space around
the mill, or what is commonly known as the mill-yard, was formed
by slabs and refuse stuff from the mill. Along the sides of the
bar and about the mill the bottom was a soft and muddy deposit
in which grass and rushes grew.
The plaintiff in error (defendant below) justifies the taking of
possession and the ejecting of the plaintiff below under a writ of
possession issued in the foreclosure suit.
The evidence in the case tended to show (and upon this there
appears to have been no dispute), that - Muskegon Lake is about
six miles long, with an average width of about two and a half
miles ;" that "the outlet from it into Lake Michigan is about
sixty rods long:" and though the evidence is silent as to the width
of the " outlet," yet it is evident from this language, that the lake
itself does not extend to Lake Michigan, but that it discharges its
waters into the latter through a comparatively narrow passage
called an outlet, and that this is about sixty rods long. But "the
level of the lake is affected by the level of Lake Michigan, and
rises and falls with it." It does not appear by the evidence,
whether a distinct river channel (of Muskegon river, which flows
into this lake and through it to Lake Michigan) can be traced
through the lake. Such are the facts appearing *in the case, and
it is difficult to conjecture how any other facts which might be
made to appear, could alter the effect of these upon the question
whether this lake is to be considered a part of Lake Michigan.
And though it was admitted by both parties, that "for the
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purposes of the trial, Lake Muskegon should be considered as an
estuary of Lake Michigan, and part and parcel thereof, and not
as a widening or continuation of Muskegon river, I am inclined
to consider this rather as the admission of a conclusion of law from
the facts, than as a mere admission of facts. Whether this lake
is to be considered a part of Lake Michigan or as a widening of
Muskegon river (so far as it might be material), would be a
question of law to be decided upon the facts of the case, and no
admission of the parties could bind the court as to the law. The
lake in question might partake of the characteristics of both, and
the question would then be which predominates. And upon the
assumption that a different rule is to be applied to each---which I
do not intend to be understood as admitting-I should be inclined
to hold that this lake, so far as its character can have any bearing
upon the question of riparian ownership, is to be treated as more
properly a widening of the Muskegon river or a separate lake,
than as a part of Lake Michigan. The only circumstance which
I have been able to discover tending to give it the character of
the latter, is the fact that it rises and falls with it. If this fact
were sufficient to make it a part of Lake Michigan, then it is
difficult to see why every other stream large or small which
empties into that lake, should not be considered a part of it, so
far up as it is affected by the rise and fall of the lake. The rise
and fall of Lake Michigan and the other great lakes of the same
chain, is not a tide occurring at regular intervals like that of the
ocean, nor does it arise from the same cause. And, though it is
probable their waters may be slightly affected by the lunar attraction, and a very minute tide may perhaps be detected by a long
and careful course of observation with accurate instruments, yet
the court must judicially notice, that it must be too slight to be
recognised by ordinary observation, or to serve any practical
purpose in determining the extent of riparian ownership. This
fact was judicially noticed in Lorman vs. Benson, 8 Mich. 18.
Courts must also be presumed to be so far acquainted with the
laws of nature, as to enable them judicially to determine that the
rise and fall of these lakes, is governed mainly by the same causes
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which affect the rise and fall of the rivers which flow into them,
and which rise and fall more than the lakes themselves, and thai
all the connecting straits between the lakes, such as the straits of
St. Mary (or St. Mary's river), the St. Clair and Detroit rivers,
must, of necessity, rise and fall with the lakes which they connect.
It is a matter of public notoriety, that the waters of Detroit river
vary in height at different but irregular periods, to the extent of
several feet, from this cause, and quite as much as those of Lake
Michigan or Muskegon Lake are shown to vary; yet, we all held
in Lorman vs. Benson, that the common law rule applicable to
streams above the ebb and flow of the tide applied to that river,
and I haive not been able to discover any fact or circumstance in
this case, sufficient to make a substantial difference in principle
between that case and the present; I am entirely satisfied with
the principles established by that case, and think them substantially applicable to the present. Whether the riparian ownership
extends to the centre of the lake is a question not involved in this
case; the only question being whether it extends to the place
where the mill is erected, which is in the shallow water of the lake
some twenty-nine or thirty rods from the shore, on ground which
is susceptible of beneficial private use and enjoyment as land.
The real question is, whether the ownership of section eighteen
bordering upon the lake, carries with it the ownership of the
locus in quo, not whether it extends beyond, or whether its
outward limits in the lake can be defined with precise accuracy.
But, if the water continues so shallow as to render the lands under
it susceptible of beneficial private use to the centre line of this
narrow lake, then I have no hesitation in saying I think the
riparian ownership extends to such centre line, unless indeed
there may be intervening islands, which the government have
shown an intention to reserve from the grant of the main land by
surveying them as separate tracts, in which case, the riparian
ownership would extend only to the centre line between the island
and the main land.
If the waters become so deep in approaching the centre of the
lake, as to render the land under them incapable of such private

RICE vs. RUDDIMAN.

or individual use, the question of ownership beyonu fthere it is
available for such purpose becomes as barren as the use itself, and
is of no practical importance whatever. But to deny all riparian
ownership under the shallow waters because its outward limits in
the lake cannot, a priori, without reference to the facts of the
particular case, be defined with a precision which shall settle all
other cases, would be extremely unphilosophical and contrary to
the principles and analogies of the law in other cases. There are
many classes of cases, especially where the question is between
the rights of individuals and those of the public, in which the
precise line cannot be drawn by any general rule applicable alike
to all cases. But the law does not, therefore, deny thd existence
of both public and private rights nor either of them; and the
courts, admitting the existence of both, seek to determine the
question between them upon the facts of the particular cases as
they arise. I do not mean to say that the ownership of the tract
here in question; or any other tract bordering upon the lake, must
necessarily extend into the lake in the direction of the side lines
of the tract; this might depend upon the shape of the lake and
the relative rights of adjoining owners. But no such question
arises here. When the question arises between adjoining owners,
it will not be found difficult of decision within the principle of
adjudged cases.
But this riparian ownership does not carry with it the right to
the exclusive and unrestricted use of the lands ordinarily covered
by the water: as in the case of rivers, that use must, in all cases,
be subordinate to the paramount public right of navigation, and
such other public rights as may be incident thereto,-in other
words, all the private or individual use and enjoyment of which
the land is susceptible, subordinate to, and consistent with the
public right, belong to the riparian owner as against any other
person seeking to appropriate it to his individual use.
These principles, when applied to Muskegon Lake, can no more
interfere with the public right of navigation than when applied to
rivers. In both cases the ownership is equally qualified by and
subordinate to the rights of the public. In fact, navigation is
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much more likely to be benefited than injured by the applicatiou
of these principles. Wharves and other similar erections are
essential to the interests of navigation; and, if the bed of the
lake to high or low water-mark was vested in the state, no private
owner could extend a wharf one foot from the water line, without
becoming a trespasser and incurring the risk of losing his improvement, though navigation might be aided rather than ipjured by i4;
while, by admitting the riparian ownership as above explained,
individual enterprise is stimulated to improvement, and the public
interest is subserved. The public, through their proper authorities, have always the right to restrain any encroacbment which
may be injurious to the public right, and to compel the removal
of any obstruction or impediment, as well as to punish the offender
to the same extent as if the bed of the lake were vested in the
state.
I am not aware that the state, or the federal government, has at
any time asserted any right or claim to the beds of the lakes more
than to those of the rivers, and I think the same principles of
riparian ownership apply equally to both. I speak here of the
small lakes within the states, because the large lakes on our
borders are not involved in the present case, though I am not
aware that the state or the United States has ever asserted any
claim with respect to the one more than the other, and I must
frankly admit, that I have not as yet seen any sound reasons for
making a:distinction, based upon a difference of size between lakes,
more than between rivers: Jones vs. Soulard, 24 Howard 40;
nor, because some may be a state or national boundary while
others are not; But without expressing any opinion upon the
large lakes upon our borders, I think the general understanding
and common usage of the country, have as clearly recognised the
principles of riparian ownership with reference to the lakes as to
the rivers within the state, and that this general understanding
and common usage7 have been constantly acted upon; and, that
capital and labor to a very great extent have been expended on
the faith of them, cannot admit of a reasonable doubt. To
repudiate this common usage at this late day by creating an
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arbitrary distinction which has no foundation in the nature of
things, and to recognise in the state or the United States a right
of property in the beds of the hundreds of lakes and natural ponds
within her limits, would, in my opinion, be an unwarrantable
interference with private property and do incalculable mischief.
These lakes and ponds are scattered over almost all parts of
the state; they impart to the landscape the charm of picturesque
scenery, their banks are often selecced as favorite sites for
residence, and command a high price; these considerations entered
into the original purchase from the government and every subsequent purchase. Much, and, in many cases, most of the value of
these locations and the residences upon them, consists in the
beauty of the prospect which the lakes afford. But if the land
under them belong to the state or the federal government, any
man may go into the shallow water a few feet from the shore and
erect in front of such dwellings, mills, fishing-houses, or such
other buildings as his profit, convenience, or malice may dictate,
and thereby destroy the beauty of the prospect and the value of
the property, and the owner has no remedy but as one of the
public at large. The atttorney-general could not well interpose
for the protection of the owner's private interest alone, and the
public right would not in general be impaired.
Some of these lakes form no part of a chain of navigable waters,
and are not susceptible of public use for purposes of navigation;
some of them are entirely enclosed by the lands of a single owner.
If the bed of the lake belongs to the state or to the United States
in ohe case, I do not see why it does not equally in others,
wherever it has been meandered by the public surveys. Some
startling consequences would flow from such a doctrine, which it
unnecessary here to notice.
There is much good sense in the observations of the Supreme
Court of Ohio in aavit's Administrators vs. Ukambers, 3 Ohio R.
495, and they have met with the very general assent of the courts,
especially in the Western States.- And though these observations
were applied to a river, they are, I think, equally applicable to the
lakes; and if the beds of these lakes are to be treated "as an
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appropriated territory, a door isopened to incalculable mischiefs.
Intruders upon the common waste would fall into endless broils
amongst themselves, and involve the owners of adjacent lands in
controversies innumerable. Stones, soil, gravel, the-right to fish,
would all be subjects of individual scramble, necessarily leading to
violence and outrage."
I am, therefore, well satisfied, that both public and private
interests are best subserved by recognising the principles' of
riparian ownership in respect to the lakes, substantially to the
same extent as applied to rivers.
The charge of the court below, applying to Muskegon Lake the
law. applicable to tide-waters, was erroneous. The judgment must
therefore be reversed with costs, and a new trial granted.
J.-On the trial, it was admitted -that Muskegoh
Lake is "can arm or estuary of Lake Michigan, and parti and
parcel thereof." The charge was based.upon this admission; and
its correctness must be tested by it.
In Lorman vs. Benson, 8 Mich. 18, the common law rule that
gives to the owner of land on a river above tide-wateri the bea of
the stream to the middle of the stream, was held applicable tor~he
Detroit river, which differs from ordinary -ivers,tmoly tn that it
connects two lakes-St. Clair and F4ie.-having.its orfgii: in, one
and terminating in the other.
To,apply this rule to our large lakes, it seems to me-would :bI'
absurd. To hold for instance, that a deed. of one acreof land&, in
a square form, bounded on one side .by Lake Mihigan conteys as
an incident to the grant a strip of land of ,the same ,vidth, extending forty or fifty miles into the lhke, with the sole' right, in thi
grantee to take fish in the waters covering the same-for .the
ownership of the bed df a stream carries with it.thia-right, ('hoker
vs. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90; Angell on Watorcouzsesi56-world
be an anomaly so great- -that it would.'oIymeed. to,be,stated. to~te
MANNING,
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It does not follow from this, howe'ver, thitthe owners.-of lanIa
on our lalieshave no geater rights in the lakes than the itizei
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of the state at large. Whether they have or not is the present
subject of inquiry. As individuals, as citizens of the state, they
have not. But there may be rights connected with the land itself,
growing out of location, public policy, or having some other origin,
to which they may be entitled, and which are not common to the
citizens of the state at large, or to persons owning lands not thus
situated.
We have no legislation on the subject, and in the absence of all
legislation the inquiry is, what are the rights of the citizens of the
state in our great lakes ? They are the rights of navigation and
of fishing. These rights are common to all, whether they own
land on the lake-shore or not. At the same time, it must be
admitted that the owners of such lands have greater facilities
for the enjoyment of these rights than others. In this respect
they may be likened to a person residing on a highway, while their
fellow-citizens generally may be likened to a person residing at a
distance from such highway, and -who has no means of approaching
it except over the land of another. Both have equal rights to the
use of the highway when upon it, but the first, by reason of his
residence, has a facility for using it which the other has not.
Bt the similitude fails, or does not hold good, when we attempt
to press it further. The highway spoken of being the work of
man, all rights connected with it are artificial or conventional.
They have no existence of themselves. Whereas the lakes are
the work of our Creator, and our rights to them as highways and
fisherles are natural and not artificial rights, and may therefore
be said to be self-existent rights. The same may be said of the
facilities for their enjoyment peculiar to the owners of the land
on the lake-shore. These are also natural and not artificial rights,
and, like all natural rights, cannot justly be taken from them by
the stateunless necessary for the good of the body politic, to
which all natural rights must yield. They are natural rights
incident to location, and of kin to the right of the owners of such
land to the lake breeze, or to the exuberant fertility of the soil,
should it prove to'be more luxuriant than the soil back from the
lake. No one would for a moment think of taking away either
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of these rights from the owner of the land. And yet the rights
of which we have been speaking are as truly rights as either of
these.
If what we have said be correct, a well settled principle of law
steps in here to aid the plaintiff in error. It is this, that-where
the law gives a right, it gives with it all minor rights necessary to
its enjoyment. Wharves and piers are almost as necessary to
navigation as vessels and ship-yards, or places for the construction
of vessels, are indispensable. May not, therefore, the owner of
the shore, under this rule, use the adjacent bed of the lake for the
construction of ways, for the launching of vessels, or of -wharves
and piers for vessels to lie at and receive and discharge their
cargoes ? The right of navigation without such right would be
incomplete.
It seems to me on principle, as well as reason, that the owner
of the shore has a right to use the adjacent bed of the lake for
such purposes. Wharves and piers must be constructed by some
one; and by whom if not by the owners of the adjacent shore?
No one else can construct them, unless it should be the state or
some one under its authority. But has the state that right? Can
the owner of the shore be cut off from the lake again.st his consent,
without taking from him those natural rights of which we have
spoken?
Without deciding this point, the doubt suggested by it may suffice for the custom which has prevailed so long that .it may be considered the settled policy of the state, for the owners of the shore
to construct such works and to use the bed of the lake for that
purpose. In a government like ours such is undoubtedly the true
interest of the state. It stimulates individual enterprise, encroaches
on no private right, leaves the public rights of navigation and of
fishing unimpaired, and turns to a good account what would only
be a profitless monopoly in the hands of the state.
Mills and manufactories, unlike wharves and piers, do not add
to the conveniences or usefulness of. the lakes as highways or.
thoroughfares; and yet they seem to me clearly to come within
the. state policy mentioned. A different policy as to them would

RICE vs. RUDDIMAN.

depress rather than encourage enterprise, and render that unproductive which otherwise might be made useful. I am, therefore,
of opinion that all such constructions connected and used with the
shore pass as an incident or appurtenance of the shore in a conveyance of the latter.
J.-I
concur entirely in the views of my brother
I think the riparian proprietor is entitled to all
the control of the bed of the water which can be exercised without
damage to the public interest. His right is proprietary and absolute. And while I think that the particular place in controversy
is no part of Lake Michigan, I do not regard the distinction as at
all material. Usage as well as reason extends t6 the one as well
as to the other. Navigation in our day cannot do without wharves
and similar conveniences for loading and shelter, and instead of
being universal nuisances, they are in general indispensable aids
to it. The inquiries concerning ownership in deep water, far from
shore, can never become practical questions, and it cannot make
any difference how they are settled. But wherever use can be
and is made of the bed of the water, in improvements near the
shore, in waters not governed by the artificial common law rules
of tide-water ownership, I think the rules applicable to fresh-water
rivers are more reasonable and just, and are certainly more con
formable to the common understanding and usage. They preserve
all valuable public privileges, and interfere with no rights whatever.
CAMPBELL,

CHRISTIANCY.

C. J.-I
concur fully in the views of my brother
CHRISTIANCY.
I think the rights of riparian proprietors upon
our interior lakes-and I regard Lake Muskegon as such, and not
as an arm of Lake Michigan, notwithstanding the stipulation which,
although it may be taken for true, I regard as immaterial-are the
same 4s those of proprietor's upon our navigable streams. They
have the right to constr uct wharves, buildings, and other improvements in front of their lands, and, so long as the public servitude
is not thereby impaired, they are a part of the realty and pass
40
MARTIN,

